This paper is a first study on the usage of nonsystematic codes based on scrambling matrices for physical layer security. The chance of implementing transmission security at the physical layer is known since many years, but it is now gaining an increasing interest due to its several possible applications. It has been shown that channel coding techniques can be effectively exploited for designing physical layer security schemes, in such a way that an unauthorized receiver, experiencing a channel different from that of the authorized receiver, is not able to gather any information. Recently, it has been proposed to exploit puncturing techniques in order to reduce the security gap between the authorized and unauthorized channels. In this paper, we show that the security gap can be further reduced by using non-systematic codes, able to scramble information bits within the transmitted codeword.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite nowadays transmission security is often implemented at higher layers, the idea of achieving it at physical layer has been the inspiring basis for the development of the modern theory of cryptography.
When security is implemented at physical layer, all receivers share the same (complete) knowledge of the transmission technique, without the need of any form of secret sharing. The channel is responsible for differentiation among users, and security is only based on the differences among the channels experienced by authorized and unauthorized users. A very simple model, well suited to represent physical layer security schemes, is the wire-tap channel, first introduced by Wyner in 1975 [1] . In the wire-tap channel model, a transmitter (Alice) sends information to the legitimate receiver (Bob), but this is also received by the eavesdropper (Eve). Alice can adopt whatever randomization, encoding and modulation scheme before transmitting her message, and both Bob and Eve are perfectly aware of the transmission technique she uses; so, at least in principle, they are both able to recover the plaintext message (u) from the ciphertext (c). However, the channel that separates Alice from Bob is generally different from that between Alice and Eve. For this reason, the ciphertext received by Bob (c B ) is different from that gathered by Eve (c E ). So, after inverting the encoding map, the message obtained by Bob (u B ) can differ from that recovered by Eve (u E ). A block scheme of the wire-tap channel is reported in Fig. 1 .
Based on these assumptions, physical layer security on the wire-tap channel is achieved when Bob is able to exactly reconstruct the plaintext message, i.e., u B = u, with very high probability, whereas the message recovered by Eve loses its correlation with u. An important parameter for the wiretap channel is the secrecy capacity, defined as the highest transmission rate at which Eve is unable to decode any information.
A lot of literature is devoted to studying the wire-tap channel capacity and how to achieve it. For a detailed discussion on the wire-tap channel and its secrecy capacity, we refer the interested reader to [2] , [3] and the references therein. The literature confirms that an increasing attention has been devoted to the application of classic and modern coding techniques on the wire-tap channel [3]- [7] .
In this study, we are interested in the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) wire-tap model, where the secrecy capacity equals the difference between the two channel capacities [8] . So, in order to achieve transmission security, Bob's channel must have higher signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than Eve's channel. Alternatively, a feedback channel between Alice and Bob (also accessible to Eve) is needed [9] , but such case is not considered in this paper.
In the context defined above, an important parameter is the security gap, that expresses the quality difference between Bob's and Eve's channels required to achieve a sufficient level of physical layer security. An important target is to keep the security gap as small as possible, in such a way as to achieve physical layer security even with a small degradation of Eve's channel with respect to Bob's one. Some recent literature has been devoted to the study of the way such reduction can be achieved by exploiting techniques from coding theory [5] .
In this paper, we investigate how the security gap can be reduced by exploiting non-systematic transmission, in which the information bits are not in clear within the transmitted codewords, being scrambled during encoding. In particular, we show that such solution, suitably combined with error correcting codes, can outperform other schemes, recently proposed, based on punctured codes, as it provides smaller secrecy gaps for a given set of parameters. Both the cases of hard-decoded classic block codes (e.g., BCH codes) and modern soft-decoded block codes (e.g., LDPC codes) are considered and reveal to be equally effective.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the notation. In Section III we describe the coding scheme and the role of scrambling. In Section IV the analysis is extended to the case of non-systematic LDPC codes. In Section V we compare the performance, in terms of secrecy gap, of the solutions considered. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. NOTATION AND RELATED WORK
We consider an AWGN wire-tap channel model in which Alice sends a secret message in the form of a 1 × k binary vector u. Before transmission, the secret message is encoded by Alice into a 1 × n binary word c, with n ≥ k, that is then transmitted over the channel. The secrecy rate R s is defined as the ratio between the secret message length and the transmitted word length. So, in the case we consider, the secrecy rate coincides with the transmission rate:
More in general, it should be R s ≤ R, since part of the transmitted information bits could be non-secret. The special case R s = R is considered here for the sake of simplicity. The transmitted word is received by Bob and Eve through two different channels. We denote by c B the noisy word received by Bob and by c E the noisy word received by Eve, respectively. Bob's and Eve's channels are corrupted by AWGN with different SNR:
is Bob's channel energy per bit to noise power spectral density ratio, whereas E b N0 E is the same parameter for Eve's channel. Similarly, P B e is Bob's bit error probability and P E e is Eve's one. Security at physical layer is achieved when Bob has bit error probability lower than a given threshold, P B e ≤ P B e , while Eve's bit error probability is greater than another threshold (next to 0.5), P E e ≥ P E e . Starting from the curve of bit error probability versus signal-to-noise ratio, for the transmission technique adopted, the security gap S g is easily obtained as:
are such that:
Many works have been devoted to the study of what transmission techniques are best suited to reduce the security gap. In particular, in [5] , the authors propose the usage of punctured codes, by associating the secret bits to punctured bits. They consider punctured LDPC codes and prove that such technique, for a fixed secrecy rate, is able to guarantee a considerable reduction in the security gap with respect to non-punctured (systematic) transmission.
In this paper, we consider an alternative solution, based on non-systematic coding obtained through scrambling. As we will show in the following sections, such solution is able to achieve a strong reduction in the security gap, that becomes comparable (and even better) than that obtained through puncturing.
III. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY THROUGH NON-SYSTEMATIC CODES
In the scheme we consider, Alice implements the encoding map as follows:
where G is the k × n generator matrix of an (n, k)-linear block code in systematic form, and S is a non-singular k × k binary scrambling matrix. Due to its systematic character, G can also be written as G = [I|C], where I is a k × k identity matrix and C is a k × (n − k) matrix representing the parity-check constraints. A similar encoding map is adopted in the McEliece cryptosystem [10] , where the encoded word is also permuted. Based on these assumptions, the encoded word can also be written as
where c l is the vector containing the first k bits of c, while c r collects its last r bits. Both Bob's and Eve's channels introduce errors. However, as mentioned, E b N0 B must be large enough to ensure that, with very high probability, Bob's decoder is able to correct all errors, thus delivering, after descrambling,
must be small enough to ensure that, after decoding, the codeword obtained by Eve is still affected by an error vector e. So, in this case, at the output of the descrambler, Eve has:
where e l is the left part of the error vector e = [e l |e r ]. From (5) we notice that, if matrix S is suitably chosen, descrambling can have the effect of amplifying the residual errors after decoding.
For the goals of the present paper, it is preliminarily useful to obtain, in analytical terms, an estimate of the bit error probability (P e ) and frame error probability (P f ) for Bob and Eve in absence or in presence of scrambling. For such purpose, we first refer to two explicative cases, namely, unitary rate coding and t-error correcting coding. In the next section, we will provide further results, based on numerical simulations, in which we consider LDPC coding and we will compare the proposed approach with that based on puncturing.
A. Unitary Rate Coding
We can consider the case of unitary rate coding by imposing k = n and G coincident with a k × k identity matrix I k . If we also assume the absence of scrambling, the code is systematic, and the system coincides with a framed uncoded transmission. Focusing attention on the case of Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK), the bit and frame error probabilities are given by:
In order to estimate the effect of the non-systematic transmission induced by the introduction of a scrambling matrix with row and column weight > 1, we can first refer to an ideal case we call perfect scrambling. It models a scrambling technique that, in presence of one (or more) error(s), produces maximum uncertainty. In other terms, under the hypothesis of perfect scrambling, a single residual bit error in the decoded word is sufficient to ensure that, on average, half of its bits are in error after descrambling. In practice, perfect scrambling can be approached by using S matrices with a dense inverse, that is, with a high density of 1 symbols. A proper scrambling effect is obtained when the density of S −1 is about 0.5, but also a lower density could reach an almost perfect scrambling effect. However, too sparse S −1 matrices are unable to provide an adequate scrambling effect. The same occurs when using too dense S −1 matrices, that are able to introduce a fraction of bit errors > 0.5 in each erred frame (but that becomes < 0.5 when Eve simply flips all bits).
It is easy to prove that, under the condition of perfect scrambling, the bit error probability after descrambling equals half the frame error probability expressed by (6) , that is:
When we instead adopt a real scrambling matrix, the bit error probability for a unitary rate coded transmission can be estimated through combinatorial arguments.
We denote by w ≤ k the column weight of matrix S −1 , that we suppose regular for simplicity. Let P j be the probability that a received k-bit vector contains j errors before descrambling, and P i|j the probability that exactly i out of j errors are selected by a weight w column of S −1 . Under such assumptions, the bit error probability on each received bit, after descrambling, can be expressed as follows:
As a numerical example, we have considered the case k = n = 1576 (that will be of interest in the following) and calculated the bit error probability for several degrees of scrambling. Fig. 2 shows the curves of P S e for some values of w, and for the two limit cases of absence of scrambling (unscrambled transmission) and perfect scrambling.
As we observe from the figure, the unscrambled transmission gives low values of bit error probability even at rather low SNR. On the contrary, by assuming a sufficiently large value of w, scrambling permits us to keep the bit error probability close to 0.5 (corresponding to the case of complete lack of information) up to a rather high E b N0 threshold. In addition, scrambling helps to improve the slope of the P e curve, so reducing the security gap. As expected, perfect scrambling ensures the best performance, but an S −1 matrix with density ≈ 0.19 (w = 300) is sufficient to have a similar (optimal) behavior.
B. t-Error Correcting Coding
In order to further improve the slope of the P e curves, a linear block code with dimension k < n can be introduced. In this subsection, we consider the adoption of an (n, k) linear block code able to correct t bit errors under hard-decision decoding. Such code could be, for example, a Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) code; in the following we will consider the (2047, 1354) BCH code, able to correct t = 69 errors, that has a value of k not so different from that considered in the previous subsection.
In presence of a t-error correcting code with rate R < 1, under the hypothesis of bounded-distance decoding, the probability (P j ) that the first k bits (necessary to descramble the information bits) in each received codeword contain j errors can be expressed as follows:
where P 0 is the channel bit error probability, that takes into account the bandwidth expansion due to the code:
Based on (10), we can estimate P f = k j=1 P j as the probability that a frame has one or more errors in its k information bits; so, in presence of perfect scrambling, the bit error probability becomes:
(12) When actual scrambling matrices are adopted, Eq. (8) can be used again, with P j given by (10) . Some examples of P e curves are shown in Fig. 3 , where we have considered the (2047, 1354, 69) BCH code with different levels of scrambling.
By a comparison with Fig. 2 (that, however, refers to a slightly different value of k) we see that the introduction of the code reduces the signal-to-noise ratio (as obvious and expected) and, mostly important for our purposes, increases the slope of the P S e and P P S e curves. Besides the slope increase, scrambling contributes to emphasize the knee between the region of high bit error probability and that of low/medium bit error probability, that is the actual requirement for having a small secrecy gap. From Fig. 3 we see that w = 20 (density w/k ≈ 0.015) is enough for this purpose, while in absence of the code (see Fig. 2 ) w = 300 (density w/k ≈ 0.19) was necessary.
IV. NON-SYSTEMATIC LDPC CODES
As an example of Soft-In Soft-Out modern error correcting schemes, we have considered LDPC codes, to which we have applied the approach of non-systematic transmission based on scrambling. For the sake of comparison, we have also considered the approach based on puncturing proposed in [5] .
Non-systematic LDPC codes have been already studied outside the physical layer security issue. In particular, they have been proved able to give a significant advantage over systematic encoding in the presence of source redundancy. In [11] - [14] non-systematic LDPC codes for redundant source data are studied. Non-systematic encoding is accomplished by using the same scrambling approach considered in this paper or through alternative techniques as post-coding and splitting.
A similar approach for obtaining non-systematic LDPC codes is presented in [15] , where the authors aim at designing codes with sparse generator matrices, in such a way that the bit error probability remains not far from that of systematic LDPC codes. We notice that such target is diametrically opposed to physical layer security.
In our simulations, we have considered two LDPC codes designed through the Progressive Edge Growth (PEG) algorithm [16] . Both codes have a lower triangular parity-check matrix, in such a way as to allow systematic encoding without the need of Gaussian elimination. The first code has length n = 2364, dimension k = 1576 (hence, code rate R = 2/3) and it has been used for simulation of systematic and non-systematic transmission. The latter has been obtained by adopting a dense 1576×1576 scrambling matrix, in order to approach the effect of a perfect scrambler. The second code has length n = 3940 and dimension k = 1576. It has been used to simulate punctured transmission, by puncturing all its 1576 information bits. So, the transmission rate is 1576/ (3940 − 1576) = 2/3, as for the cases without puncturing. Fig. 4 shows the simulated performance, in terms of bit error probability, for the considered transmission schemes based on LDPC codes. As we observe from the figure, the systematic transmission ensures the best performance in terms of error correction capability. However, in the considered context of physical layer security, it shows an important drawback, that is, a bit error probability significantly smaller than 0.5 even at low signal-to-noise ratio (the same behavior was observed in Figs. 2 and 3) .
The approach based on puncturing gives worse error correcting performance, with a loss of about 0.5 dB in the waterfall region with respect to systematic LDPC coding. However, the usage of punctured bits for transmitting the secret message is able to ensure a higher bit error probability for low signal-to-noise ratio. Both such aspects can be improved by adopting non-systematic unpunctured LDPC codes based on the proposed scrambling technique: the performance loss with respect to the systematic LDPC code is about 0.3 dB in the waterfall region, and the bit error probability is maintained close to 0.5 in a larger interval of signal-to-noise ratios. These facts reflect on the security gap over the AWGN wire-tap Rate-1 Scrambled BCH Scrambled LDPC Systematic LDPC Scrambled LDPC Punctured , it is possible to estimate Eve's bit error probability P E e as a function of the gap S g . Fig. 5 reports these curves for the considered transmission techniques. In the figure, for all techniques that adopt scrambling, the perfect scrambling condition has been considered (simulation of the scrambled LDPC code has been done with a dense S −1 matrix, able to approach perfect scrambling).
As we observe from the figure, the usage of a systematic LDPC code gives a very slow convergence of P E e to the ideal value of 0.5. So, such technique requires a very high security gap for realistic values of P E e (that are usually ≥ 0.4). The reason of such a slow convergence is systematic transmission: if we adopt a non-systematic unitary rate code, even renouncing any error correction capability, performance is improved and P E e ≥ 0.4 is reached for a gap value around 5 dB. The situation can be further improved by adopting non-systematic error correcting codes. If we implement nonsystematicity through puncturing, the condition P E e ≥ 0.4 is achieved at a 2.2 dB gap.
The best performance is achieved by implementing nonsystematic coded transmission through scrambling. Both the BCH and the LDPC codes, under the condition of perfect scrambling, give very good performance: P E e ≥ 0.4 is reached at 1.3 dB and 1.4 dB gap by the scrambled BCH and LDPC codes, respectively. Obviously, LDPC codes have the advantage of permitting us to work at smaller SNR.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied non-systematic codes based on scrambling for physical layer security. We have estimated the security gap over the AWGN wire-tap channel as a measure of the effectiveness of several transmission schemes.
Our results show that systematic coded transmission (as well as uncoded transmission) is unsuited to such kind of applications, while non-systematic transmission is able to reduce the security gap. We have compared non-systematic transmission implemented through scrambling and puncturing, and shown that the former one is able to outperform the latter, requiring a smaller security gap.
